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AN OLD JURISPRUDENCE:
RESPECT IN RETROSPECT
Anita Bernsteint
In The New Jursprudence of Sexual Harassment,' Kathryn Abrams
does one of my articles great honor, and I ought to acknowledge the
tribute before beginning to carp. Professor Abrams regards my Treat-
ing Sexual Harassment with Respect ("Treating')2 as prominent in a vast
landscape. All the big ideas appear. First Catharine MacKinnon, nat-
urally, and the Meritor landmark.3 Then Abrams surveys post-Meritor
scholarship, modestly obscuring her classic Gender Discrimination and
the Transformation of Workplace Norms4 in a string cite.5 Over the last
twenty years or so, Abrams explains, these much-studied writings have
articulated the "why," the "what," and the "how" of sexual harassment
law.6
t Professor of Law and Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of
Law. Thanks to Jacob Corr6 for helpful conversation.
1 Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REv.
1169 (1998).
2 Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARv. L. REV. 446
(1997).
3 SeeAbrams, supra note 1, at 1169-70 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986); CATHAmINE A. MACKINNON, SEXuAL HARASSMENT OF WORMNG WOMEN (1979)).
4 Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42
Vu-D. L. REv. 1183 (1989) [hereinafter Abrams, Gender Discrimination]. According to a
Lexis search, Gender Discrimination has been cited in 156 articles and seven judicial opin-
ions. Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library Mega file; Lawrev library, LRALR file (Mar. 3,
1998). It is included in Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), the reasonable-
woman landmark. Id. at 879 n.9. Although reasonable woman standards appeared in a few
earlier sexual harassment cases, see Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482
(3d Cir. 1990); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987), Ellison is widely
regarded as the great precedent, thanks to the influence of Gender Discrimination. Ellison,
one of a handful of truly feminist federal appellate opinions, encouraged numerous ob-
servers to believe that the reasonable woman standard was a good idea and showed that
courts are open to progress and willing to learn about the experience of women at work.
See Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and
Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEx.J. WOMEN & L. 95, 122-23 (1992); Caroline Forell, Essen-
tialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 769, 798. Abrams has held
different views on this question, recommending the reasonable women standard in
Abrams, supra, at 1209-15, then backing off the standard in Kathryn Abrams, Social Con-
struction, Roving Biologism, and Reasonable Women: A Response to Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1021, 1033-37 (1992) [hereinafter Abrams, Social Construction], and finally confessing
her varying views in Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 304, 365-66 n.243 (1995) [hereinafter Abrams, Sex Wars Redux].
5 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1170 n.6.
6 Id. at 1169-70.
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Now enter two 1997 publications, Treatinge and Katherine
Franke's What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment? Abrams faults both
articles for insufficient concern with gender subordination. 9
Although we are wrong, however, we are The New Jurisprudence of
Sexual Harassment. Implicitly Abrams pairs Treating with the most
majestic law-related writing on this subject, Sexual Harassment of Work-
ing Women: like MacKinnon, I have taken on the "why." Let's not over-
look the source of this panoramic flattery: anyone who ever wrote or
thought about American sexual harassment law owes a big debt to
Professor Abrams, whose analytic clarity, bold command of doctrine,
and fluency in both feminist scholarship and word-tools for judges
and litigants are unsurpassed.
Amid this grandeur, Treating-which proposes to replace the
"reasonable person" (and reasonable woman, man, target, victim, and
so forth) of hostile environment sexual harassment doctrine with the
"respectful person"10
-is a narrow work, hardly Exhibit A of any New
Jurisprudence. Franke's ambitious reconception of sexual harassment
to accommodate postmodem insights about gender presents a theory
in high style-it is new jurisprudence indeed-but as Abrams rightly
notes," Treating examines sexual harassment with an eye toward
remediation, prevention, and other pragmatics; it builds theory only
as secondary to description. Moreover, "new" is not in my judgment
the correct modifier for a thesis that seeks to expand a venerable
concept.
"What is [hostile environment] sexual harassment?" Treating que-
ries.12 It then paraphrases its question to something wordier like
"What does it mean to say-for purposes of dispute resolution and the
implicit function of private law as a source of communication between
citizens and the state about justice-that a defendant ought to face
liability for hostile environment sexual harassment?" True, there are
a couple of moves here between the short and long versions, to which
some might object.' 3 Professor Abrams is among the objectors. She
thinks that the paraphrase neglects the central importance of the
workplace as a site of sexual harassment.' 4 More important, the Treat-
7 Bernstein, supra note 2.
8 Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment7, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691
(1997).
9 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1171-72.
10 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 452-54.
11 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1174.
12 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 446 (abstract).
13 I probably have given away my enthusiasm about torts, for one thing. On that, see
infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
14 Abrams apparently thinks it's the true site: The New Jurisprudence has much to say
about remunerative work as a foundation, Abrams, supra note 1, at 1185-86, 1198-1200,
1205-13, but only a few dismissive words about harassment in families, prisons, rental hous-
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ingquery presents a "neutered wrong."'15 Any attempt to consider hos-
tile environment sexual harassment that does not put the
subordination of women at center stage is a "moral and political"
failure. 16
The failure of Treating does not stop there: Abrams endorses the
"reasonable person," a status-quo concept in which she has invested
her labor for ten years, and rejects my "respectful person."' 7 Thus
even if Treating had not revealed a baleful decision to neglect gender
subordination, Abrams would still think it wrong for proposing a re-
form that could not improve doctrine, even in the neutered hypothet-
ical universe it posits. Inasmuch as I have stated the thesis of Treating
to be "Change the word reasonable to respectful," I will need to de-
fend the respectful person standard below.
But let me return to the more significant charge, since Abrams
does not seem to regard a rejection of "respectful person" as at the
heart of her argument. The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment
blames Treating more for what it omits than what it commits: Abrams
contends that "failing to highlight the fact that [sexual harassment]
arises from a context of systematic gender inequality ... diminishes
the imperative for responding to it."18 A surprising claim. I abhor
subordination as much as the next feminist-come the millennium
we will eliminate it root and branch. Treating does not take this
pledge explicitly, I admit, but Catherine MacKinnon wrote in 1979
that sexual harassment is (or can be) sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII,19 and Justice Rehnquist, bless him, long ago agreed.20 Must
I recite a catechism before adding to the collection plate?
In law review writing one hopes to say something helpful. Treat-
ing does not restate an eloquent literature written by others but rather
tries to read a statute, and related tort doctrines, in a way that would
aid the struggle against subordination waged in workplaces, jury delib-
erations, judicial compromises, and ordinary conversations among lay
people. I realize that Abrams disagrees with this description and
reads Treating as a retrogressive dissent from the cause. But the re-
ing, or places of public accommodation like bars. Id. at 1185, 1194 n.144. (Or Chicago
Blackhawks games, where one of my former students has endured a gauntlet on the walk
from the aisle to her season-ticket seat for the last twelve years.) Although the workplace is
indeed fundamental, and these other sites less important, I find it valuable to conceptual-
ize sexual harassment in a way that follows civil rights statutes and tort doctrine: both "sex
discrimination" and "tortious conduct" can exist outside of employment.
15 Id. at 1184-88.
16 Id. at 1187-88.
17 Id. at 1224; see also id. at 1183 n.85 (discussing Abrams's efforts on behalf of
'reasonableness").
18 Id. at 1187.
19 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 5-6 (1979).
20 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
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spectful person, among other things "a noninflammatory proxy for
sexist devaluation of the less powerful by the more powerful members
of a sex and gender hierarchy,"2' works toward an end that Abrams
esteems.
Treating suggests a more powerful adjective than "reasonable,"
amply precedented as a legal value, that resonates with people who
have faced subordination and avoids old pitfalls.22 By moving the in-
quiry away from a complainant's reaction and turning it on the con-
duct of employers, the switch from "reasonable" to "respectful" avoids
the victim-blaming that has marginalized and devalued women work-
ers.23 Neither endorsing nor rejecting the Abrams view of gender as
"agonistic,"24 the workplace as Kriegschauplatz, a respectful person
standard offers help in the battle: the prevention of harassment, im-
proved adjudicative remedies, and a day at work with fewer burdens
for women and men of good faith. Those who would fight subordina-
tion through law in these dark times need a victory now and then.
I
On respectful person versus reasonable person, Abrams writes
that it's unclear whether the new locution improves doctrine. 25
Although "language can be a powerful constructive force in life and
law," she is "skeptical about our power to transform substantive under-
standings ... through the alteration of a single term in a legal stan-
dard."26 Abrams suspends part of this skepticism when praising
"reasonable," however, calling it "workable," amenable to careful re-
definition, and "enlisted to answer" all the pertinent questions about
the nature of a hostile or abusive environment.27 An activist28 thus
supplies what Albert Hirschman called "the rhetoric of reaction," find-
ing futility (and laterjeopardy) in a reform proposal. 29 According to
Abrams, respect as a legal standard is simultaneously idle and danger-
21 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1187.
22 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 452-55 (critiquing reasonableness standards and arguing
that a respectful standard is more inclusive).
23 See id. at 501, 506-07; see also Abrams, Gender Discrimination, supra note 4, at 1206
(noting that the judicial search "for the ostensibly objective perspective" has entrenched
"the male-centered views of harassment"); Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 4, at 364-66
(describing pitfalls for women in current sexual harassment doctrine). This change also
harmonizes sexual harassment doctrine with legal doctrine generally. See Bernstein, supra
note 2, at 507-08.
24 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1172, 1196-97 n.154, 1198, 1205.
25 Id. at 1178-79.
26 Id. at 1184.
27 Id. at 1175-76.
28 Abrams refers to her "activism" in Abrams, Gender Discrimination, supra note 4, at
1184.
29 ALBERT 0. HIRscHmAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERvERSwiy, FuTILrIY, JEoPARDY
(1991).
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ous. Either courts and juries won't benefit from it,3° or they'll misun-
derstand it.31
Elsewhere I have defended the project of creating new doc-
trine,3 2 and other writers have offered rich versions of the argument
that language, even "a single term," is indeed a powerful, constructive
social force.33 The "substantive understandings" that a reasonable-to-
respectful revision would "transform" create change in several ways.
Abrams may have read Treating to prescribe doctrine exhorting citi-
zens to render respect in the workplace, but I had in mind more of
the converse: case law built from experiences and analogies that shape
judicial understandings of sexual harassment.
Disagreeing, Abrams tries to see meaning in an opaque word.
Treating offers sufficient evidence to show that whether "reasonable"
means "governed by ratiocination" or "average and centrist," the rea-
sonable person standard turns out inane or pernicious, or both, when
courts apply it in sexual harassment cases.34 Abrams does not quarrel
with this claim but contends that a good rehab would save the adjec-
tive and achieve most of the benefits that I associate with a respectful
person standard.35 In my view, the word isn't worth saving. You could
30 See Abrams, supra note 1, at 1178-80.
31 See id. at 1187-88.
32 Usually in the form of sympathetic, unsolicited how-to advice. SeeAnita Bernstein,
Better Living Through Crime and Tor4 76 B.U. L. REv. 169, 184-90 (1996); Anita Bernstein,
How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1539, 1559-63 (1997).
33 These scholars mix description and prescription to argue that social change gener-
ates, and also results from, doctrinal change. See, e.g., Abrams, Gender Discrimination, supra
note 4, at 1209-15 (parsing "reasonable woman"); Jane E. Larson, Introduction: Third
Wave-Can Feminists Use the Law to Effect Social Change in the 1990s, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1252,
1252-53 (1993) (describing innovation in the law as a source of social progress); see also
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 206, 213
(1890) (arguing that tort law does, or perhaps should, honor a privacy right); Edith Brown
Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495,
498-99 (1984) (combining concepts of environmentalism, intergenerational equity, and
fiduciary responsibility). See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, The Concept of Legal Culture: A
Reply, in COMPARNG LEGAL CULTUp.ES 33, 34-35 (David Nelken ed., 1997) (describing the
interrelation of social change, legal culture, and legal results such as changes in tort law).
34 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 456-80. Treating, however, finds much value in the words
'reason" and "reasonableness," albeit a peripheral value. Id. at 464 (explaining how reason
works in the prevention and remedying of sexual harassment); id. at 507-08 (detailing the
importance of the word "reasonable" in numerous areas of the law); id. at 497-504 (using
the work of Joel Feinberg to build a role for reasonableness in sexual harassment
doctrine).
35 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1177. Abrams also makes a quick plea for ratiocination as
integral to sexual harassment doctrine: "If sexual harassment is also understood as a bar-
rier to women's professional progress, or, as a denial of their capacity for self-definition or
self-direction, it seems quite capable of being apprehended by the faculties of reason." Id.
at 1176. I am not sure I follow the point. If Abrams is saying that sexual harassment often
obstructs women when they try to follow rational designs and life-plans, I am happy to
concur. But an affront to powers of ratiocination is neither necessary nor sufficient to
establish hostile environment sexual harassment in the minds of any of the players, and I
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study sexual harassment case law from now until the end of subordina-
tion and not find one judicial opinion that needs the increment of
meaning added by the word "reasonable"-pick any definition you
like-to convince its readers that a challenged work environment was,
or wasn't, hostile or abusive. Academic writers have pointed out
countless flaws in the reasonableness standards,36 loosening the judi-
cial commitment to this tradition.37 Reformist jurists need a new
term.3 8 I am inclined to favor one that works against subordination by
validating the life experiences of those disempowered by reasonable
person standards-women and African-Americans in particular.3 9
Where I see validation, however, Abrams finds sinister possibili-
ties. Treating adverts-innocuously enough, I thought-to the emo-
tional constituent of sexual harassment, stating that the experience
cannot be recounted or understood without reference to emotion;40
Abrams implies that I have called certain people "emotional" and
have claimed sexual harassment "is a women's injury that cannot be
apprehended by the rest of the population. '41 Treating urges employ-
ers to heed a respectful person standard in the workplace; Abrams
believes that I have given aid and comfort to "the man who places
women on a 'pedestal"' and "[t] he male employer who treats women
employees as he might his mother or sister, . . . declining to treat
them as serious professional contenders."42 Although the word "re-
spectability" appears nowhere in Treating, Abrams thinks that it lurks
in the shadows, and associates the respectful person with Randall Ken-
nedy's homily urging African-Americans to observe a "'politics of re-
spectability,"' and specifically to mind "'the way they are perceived by
[white] others"' before they do something boisterous, such as cele-
brate the O.J. Simpson acquittal in public.43
This last bit is unworthy of attention-I despise respectability, if it
means what I think Abrams says it means, and have never remotely
commended it44-but it does provoke me to contrast Respectful Ac-
don't think Abrams means to say that a plaintiff should have to plead and prove such an
affront.
36 See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 464-71 (documenting many of these works).
37 See id. at 477-80.
38 For a discussion of what is wrong with the old substitutes, see id. at 471-80 (address-
ing, inter alia, the reasonable woman).
39 Id. at 456-60, 511-12.
40 Cf Bernstein, supra note 2, at 452 (discussing respect in terms of morality and self-
esteem).
41 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1176.
42 Id. at 1183 n.84.
43 Id. at 1182 (quoting RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, GRIME, AND THE LAw 21 (1997)).
44 Abrams does not disagree. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1183 ("Bernstein, of course,
does not advocate the pursuit of respectability, as Kennedy does, or as 19th century middle-
class domestic morality did."). Abrams's sources on "respectability" consist of Randall Ken-
nedy's exhortations on African-Americans and unpublished manuscripts by Mary Louise
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cording to Abrams with Reasonable According to Bernstein. Both
Abrams and I have seized on a word and educed its flaws. We have
identified futility and jeopardy in each other's doctrinal preference. 45
From there, we diverge. Abrams reaches fancifully into petit-bour-
geois Victorian to caricature "respect,"46 even though numerous judi-
cial and statutory uses of the word are on record; 47 I restricted myself
to those meanings of "reasonable" that courts and legal scholars have
implemented to elucidate hostile environment sexual harassment.
Abrams kicks the respectful person out of doctrine,48 even though she
admits that sexual harassment "is a failure of respect"; 4 9 I looked for,
and tried to preserve, the value of reasonableness within doctrine.50
Regarding the other two threats-emotion and the pedestal-I
am still unperturbed. Treating refers to emotion only to criticize rati-
ocination as radically incomplete for purposes of describing sexual
harassment. I've hardly advocated an emotional person standard, or
urged anyone to get in touch with his feelings, or argued that a sexual-
harassment plaintiff should have to make a showing about emotion in
her prima facie case. As for the pseudo-respectful Confederate soldier
and the pedestals he erects in the path of progress, I have two ideas
for stopping him, to the extent that he exists. One is the injury re-
quirement, implicit in all of civil litigation.51 The pedestaled victim
who gets past summary judgment will have a story of detriment and a
claim for damages. The other is the jury.52 Jurors are pretty good at
detecting condescension, hypocrisy, and smarm. They might mistake
sugary misogyny for respect, but I confidently assert that they will not
do so very often, and I call on their detractors to produce evidence of
such bias.
Abrams seems uninterested generally in the role of the jury in
sexual harassment cases, and this lack of interest is prominent in her
apologia for reasonableness standards. 53 Filling in for the courts,
Fellows. Id. at 1180-82. To Abrams, these works describe respectability as a genteel, regres-
sive trap for women and persons of color. Id. at 1181-82. The merits of "respectability"
aside, I argue in Treating for a focus on the actor accused of harassment, Bernstein, supra
note 2, at 506-07, and so mind-your-manners exhortations to subordinated groups have
nothing to do with my thesis.
45 See supra notes 25-31, 34 and accompanying text.
46 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1183.
47 See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 454.
48 See Abrams, supra note 1, at 1184-88.
49 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1184.
50 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 464, 497-504, 507-08.
51 Although an injury requirement seems somewhat at odds with her thesis, Abrams
apparently endorses it. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1226-27.
52 Treating included a partial jury instruction. See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 522-24.
53 A misguided inclination for a feminist activist. See generally Phoebe A. Haddon,
Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BiL RTs. J. 29, 80 (1994) (praising the jury for "drawing
other people into the interpretive project of adjudication"). According to Carrie Menkel-
1998] 1237
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
which have shirked their task of defining "reasonable," Abrams draws
up a definitional list of "four categories of knowledge" that the trier of
fact "must know":54 (1) sexual harassment is "but one example of the
complex set of barriers" that continue to vex women in the workplace;
(2) women associate sex in the workplace with "intimidation, objectifi-
cation and devaluation;" (3) sexual harassment "produces a range of
effects" in its targets; (4) we can infer from a target's response next to
nothing about "whether the behavior was problematic or even
whether the target felt distressed by the conduct. '55
These categories are newish ideas: Abrams would have trouble
characterizing them as immanent in Title VII or easily derived by a
common law method. Let us assume that this question of pedigree
can be dealt with.56 Let us further assume that all four assertions are
both valid and relevant. Because Abrams published her list only after
years of study, I assume she does not think that mostjurors know what
she knows, or that voir dire can work as a locus of either tutorials or
quizzes about what venirepersons understand. Instead, Abrams must
be placing her trust in the federal judiciary. Judges will screen out
unreasonable cases and frame disputes appropriately.
It is odd that Abrams, who fears such bugbears as the word "emo-
tion" and who dreads letting jurors near the concept of respect, can
regard so blithely these entrenched mostly-white-and-male politicians,
in the teeth of what she knows about where they came from and what
they value. Appointees of Presidents Reagan and Bush make up a
large percentage of the federal judges Abrams might reach. Filtered
to exclude "liberals," the criminal defense bar, police brutality liti-
gators, death penalty opponents, union-side labor lawyers, supporters
of Roe v. Wade (in the early years), and persons unwilling to assure FBI
interlocutors that they'd never tried marijuana, 57 these judges proba-
bly did not begin their tenure disposed to the MacKinnonism inher-
ent in the Abrams list. Clinton judges are usually viewed as not much
Meadow, present discourse treats the judge as male (rational, justice-oriented, in com-
mand of abstractions) and the jury as female (empirical, care-oriented, immersed in partic-
ulars). Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Dfferent Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering
Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39, 59 (1985).
54 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1178 n.50.
55 Id. I have rejected this line of thought, arguing that nowhere in "reasonable" can
one find feminist activism. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 469 n.143.
56 I laid the groundwork in Treating to argue that respect is a familiar legal concept,
Bernstein, supra note 2, at 512-21, and I don't want to put another writer (or reader)
through those paces. But anyone who would fault Treating for its deviance or novelty
should apply this criterion consistently to the Abrams reform.
57 See Christopher E. Smith & Thomas P. Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-
Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 ALa. L. Rzv. 1111, 1117-22 (1994); Timothy
B. Tomasi &Jess A. Velona, Note, All the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appoint-
ments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 766, 767-70 (1987).
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different.58 Does Abrams propose to school these people in "the al-
most aesthetic distaste all hetero-patriarchs feel for individuals who
transgress gender stereotypes,"59 "the entrenchment of masculine
norms,"60 and the way in which sexual harassment "genders both men
and women through a variety of dynamics commensurate with their
individual and subgroup based variations"?61 If so, by what means? Is
there a precedent?62 Life-tenured, politically vetted federal judges
have little incentive to work at revising what they know. 63 A respectful
person standard, by bringing common sense to doctrine, can educate
judges-and everyone else in the workplace-incrementally and with-
out bombast.
58 See Jurist Prudence, THE NATION, Jan. 26, 1998, at 4, 5 (noting that of Clinton's first
187 judicial appointments, 182 were unopposed by Republicans). Some say that Clinton
did little in his appointments to reverse the Reagan-Bush criteria. See Neil A. Lewis, In
Selecting FederalJudges, Clinton Has Not Tried to Reverse Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996,
at A20. Others say he did nothing. See Alexander Cockburn, Don't Be Fooled Again, THE
PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1996, at 19, 20; Nat Hentoff, Bill Clinton's Judges, VILLAGE VOIcE, Oct. 29,
1996, at 25;John Nichols, The Clinton Courts: Liberals Need Not Apply, THE PROGRESSIVE, Sept.
1996, at 25, 27. Even the American electorate, not reliably up on this kind of thing, horse-
laughed Bob Dole's 1996 complaint about "liberal Clinton judges" clear out of public dis-
cussion, maybe even off talk radio for all I know.
59 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1199.
60 Id. at 1210.
61 Id. at 1220.
62 Fueled with plenty of money and favored by political winds that blew gently at his
back-advantages that Abrams may never have-Henry Manne didn't get far in his quest
to make federal judges believe in prescriptive microeconomics. The Manne manifesto for
judges appears injames A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne, Editors'Preface to ECONOMIC IaBERTIES
AND THE JUDICIARY at xix (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987); see also Jurist
Prudence, supra note 58, at 5 (documenting attempts by the "right-wing" Scaife, Olin, and
Bradley foundations to influence judges through "educational" means). On the limited
nature of Manne's success, see Margaret V. Sachs, Freedom of Contract: The Trojan Horse of
Rule 10b-5, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879, 886-87 & n.44 (1994) (noting the percentage of
federal judges who had been trained at one of Manne's "economics institutes"; estimates
were 40% in 1987 and "one-third" in 1993); Chris Klein, Manne's an Island, NAT'L LJ., Dec.
30, 1996, atA16 (reporting the ouster of Manne at George Mason University Law School).
Although law and economics has a reputation for influence and has certainly played a
prominent role in the academy, many writers describe its effect on judges as moderate. See
NEIL DuxBuRy, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 360-61 (1995) (reporting measured
gains); Sachs, supra, at 887-88 (describing limits of economic analysis in the Supreme
Court's interpretation of securities statutes).
63 It is hard to gauge the quantity of resistance that federal judges manifest. Although
many of them work hard to accrete new learning, those proposals for the continuing edu-
cation of judges that I've seen are made with a tact that suggests barriers of inertia and
disinclination. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific
Evidence, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1481, 1513-16 (1995). Four-fifths of district courtjudges have
never edified themselves with a court-appointed expert under Federal Rule of Evidence
706, which providesjudges with the opportunity to be educated on a discrete point of their
own choosing, an opportunity that can help them make a correct decision and look good
in print. SeeJoe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a
Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY LJ. 995, 1004-05 &
tbl.1 (1994).
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II
These references to judges, juries, summary judgment, and "the
injury requirement" bring me to the larger criticism that sexual har-
assment is really about the gender agon-a struggle, Abrams says, that
Treating mischievously subverts by emphasizing what private law can
do. Treating "individualizes the wrong, '64 recommending a myopic fo-
cus on one workplace at a time-one plaintiff, one employer accused
of disrespect. The problem, Abrams reminds us, is collective and en-
trenched: the wrong of sexual harassment extends deep into a history
that precedes any individual lawsuit.65 "This is not simply an abstract
point," Abrams warns, "but an issue with ramifications for public edu-
cation, legal enforcement, and private efforts at prevention. '66
She takes me back fondly to our shared days at law school. Like
many influential scholars, Abrams learned about the law from Owen
Fiss. The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment is at least indebted to,
if not directly descended from, a vision expressed in Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause,67 The Supreme Court, 1978-Foreword: The Forms
ofJustice,68 and The Civil Rights Injunction.69 Another probable ances-
tor, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation by Abram Chayes, 70
seems to inform Abrams's conception of sexual harassment as more of
a threat to "group rights" than to individual rights. 71
What's wrong, to cadge a phrase from Professor Franke, with con-
joining group rights and sexual harassment law? Nothing, maybe.
Treating tried to stay neutral on the question, and my aversion to
group rights is not strong. No one can deny that women belong to a
group that receives extra harm from sexual harassment.72 Moreover,
as Franke has shown, this "technology of sexism"73 inflicts gender-re-
lated injury on more people, and in more ways, than current case law
64 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1187.
65 Id. at 1187.
66 Id. at 1187.
67 Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause 5 PHIL. & PuB. Are. 107 (1976)
(exploring the structure and limitations of the anti-discrimination principle).
68 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv.
L. REv. 1 (1979) (describing relations among citizens, state bureaucracies, and the
judiciary).
69 OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUN CrION (1978) (examining the hierarchy of
remedies in the American legal system).
70 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 I-LAuv. L. REv. 1281
(1976).
71 Id. at 1316 (referring to "the deep and durable demand for justice" that groups
present to the courts); Fiss, supra note 68, at 19 (commending "the group perspective on
the victim").
72 I said as much. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 456, 460-61; see also id. at 482 (noting
indirectly that the respectful person standard would work fine in class actions).
73 Franke, supra note 8, at 693.
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reveals.74 I would have preferred to condemn disrespect in the work-
place without disparaging anyone else's conception of injustice. But
now that I have been pressed to account for my emphasis on individ-
ual collisions, a short survey of those objections to group rights that
pertain to sexual harassment doctrine is in order.
For openers, we have the familiar problem of framers' intent.
Back in the heady seventies, when much more seemed possible, Owen
Fiss stopped short of Title VII, limiting his group-rights innovation to
constitutional claims based on the Equal Protection Clause.75 Abram
Chayes's article is a eulogy in two senses, praise and lament for the
dead. While Chayes applauded public-law expansion, he also knew
that the school, housing, and prison cases had started to wane.76 It
doesn't matter, of course, what Fiss and Chayes "intended"; I mention
their hesitation only to suggest that even visionaries could see the ho-
rizon in 1976-and 1976 was a better time for antisubordination activ-
ists than the New Jurisprudence year of 1997.
A related point is judicial disinclination. Most contemporary
judges do not want to use their courts to promote political activism,
and many believe that constitutional doctrines prevent them from tak-
ing up the work that Abrams wants done.77 For decades Supreme
Court justices have endorsed this preference, 78 although I suppose a
good constitutional scholar like Abrams could propound a different
reading of their statements or call them dicta. She cannot, however,
get federal judges (whose jurisdiction is supposed to be limited) to
impose an agenda they do not share on a citizenry that pays Congress
and the state governments to protect the interests and consider the
74 Id. at 693-94.
75 See Fiss, supra note 67, at 168-70; Alan David Freeman, LegitimizingRacialDiscrimina-
tion Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine 62 MiNN. L.
REv. 1049, 1058-65 (1978) (faulting both Fiss and the Supreme Court for the small steps
they took toward eliminating discrimination through law). In another article that ad-
dresses the employment statutes at a general, unnamed level, Fiss argues that intent is not
part of the plaintiff's burden but employer motives and psychology can be relevant from
time to time. Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. Rsv. 235, 297-
300 (1971). Treating is in accord. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 492-97 (situating employer
responsibility for harassment between a fault-based and a strict liability standard); id. at 498
(noting that Title VII must not be read to demand proof of intent to injure).
76 See Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MicH. J.L.
REFORM 647, 648 (1988).
77 SeeJohn Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Author-
ity of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1121, 113741 (1996).
78 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 92-93 (1995) (limiting remedial scope of fed-
eral courts); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983) (holding that black
plaintiff did not have standing to sue for injunctive relief that would limit the authority of
police to use choke holds); cf Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown fl)
(endorsing a slow remedial pace that would not push hard against the resistance of white
citizens).
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demands of well-organized activist groups. 79 Courts use many labels
to avoid the level of abstract debate that Abrams favors: whether the
named reasons are "standing,"80 "federalism,"8' "separation of pow-
ers,"82 "the case and controversy limitation,"83 or anything else, courts
aren't heeding the call.8 4
But ultimately, I am convinced by a separate argument, rooted in
my sub-occupation. As a torts teacher, I tend to look for the defining
elements of a citizen-initiated lawsuit,85 expecting to see a plaintiff, a
defendant, an injury (usually), and a rationale for holding that this
defendant ought to be forced to restore to this plaintiff what she
wrongfully lost.8 6 Torts teachers prefer that the plaintiff prove fault,
although we accept strict liability in limited form, when the defendant
chooses to engage in certain activities from which the plaintiff does
not gain a commensurate benefit.8 7 Abram Chayes speaks slightingly
about this old-time model, ticking off its traits with some disdain. Pri-
vate parties, private ights. Bipolar. Retrospective. Right and remedy
are interdependent. Party-initiated, party-controlled.88
Now I know that a description of private-law characteristics
doesn't demonstrate what Title VII should mean; nor, in general, can
one infer "the ought" from what is. But the tort model raises issues of
competence that Abrams neglects. The public-law contrasts to private
litigation that Chayes recites-rights independent of remedies, sprawl-
ing controls, management rather than resolution 89-can be moved to
any locus of political power, whereas private law avails itself of traits
unique to the courts.90 Sexual harassment falls within the judicial
79 Cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisrRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REvIEW 148-69
(1980) (advocating a limited judicial role in the enforcement of rights, especially where
claimants are numerous and well organized).
80 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
81 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-40 (1985).
82 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 426-27 (1988); see also Robert F. Nagel, Separa-
tion of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN'. L. REV. 661, 712-18 (1978)
(explaining how the Supreme Court has been "sensitive to separation of powers
considerations").
83 Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1947).
84 See Marcus, supra note 76, at 666-68.
85 See generally Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case; 42 STAN. L. REv. 227 (1990) (noting
that federal courts have not developed an overarching definition of article III's case
requirement).
86 Another torts teacher criticizes Missouri v. Jenkins from a similar vantage point,
although his conclusions are not mine. See Richard A. Epstein, The Remote Causes of Affirma-
tive Action, or School Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1113-16
(1996).
87 See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537, 543-
48 (1972).
88 Chayes, supra note 70, at 1282-83.
89 Id. at 1284.
90 Cf L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REv. 513, 518-28 (1931) (emphasizing the
importance of historical continuity in common-law decisionmaking); Edward L. Rubin, The
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framework of tort law and tortlike actions under Title VII. The post-
1991 version of the statute fits closely within this paradigm, but the
1964 original, with its faith that lawsuits promote equality and that
courts (notjust legislatures and administrators) need broad equitable
powers, also affirms the power of private litigation.
Title VII is not a tort statute- Treating took pains on this
point91 -but the statute does depend on the players, practices, and
strengths of citizen-initiated litigation. Abrams knows as much.92 Her
posture against private-law attributes resembles the claim by Marvin
Jones that in Title VII litigation the employer is "a fiction," an "invisi-
ble discursive barrier."93 The tort influence on Title VII, Jones argues,
rests destructively on the Nietzschean motto of "every event a deed."94
Following this criticism to its logical conclusion, Jones dissolved the
adjudicative model altogether and argued in favor of a new legal lan-
guage that would "demonstrate a concern for equality as a poetic
dream."95 I'm too hardheaded to accompany Jones down that road,
even if my only alternative companion is a syphilitic proto-Nazi crack-
pot. Adjudication can't do anything without a deed.9 6 Citizens learn
principles from individuals and their actions, including the principle
of antisubordination.
CONCLUSION
The war against sexual harassment-to evoke an Abrams meta-
phor-has many fronts and needs an array of weapons. I would wage
the war in segments, moving group-related concerns to the theaters of
Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. REv. 792, 799-800 (1991)
(arguing thatjudges are on the strongest ground when they move in small increments and
work with the facts of a case).
91 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 448, 496-98.
92 In a section on doctrinal applications, Abrams offers reforms that either echo Treat-
ing's respectful person standard or collapse into slogans that have nothing to do with adju-
dication. For examples of the former tendency, see Abrams, supra note 1, at 1220
(stressing "agency," a concept I underscored in Treating, Bernstein, supra note 2, at 491-
92); Abrams, supra note 1, at 1221 (arguing that the current rule about unwelcomeness
should be abandoned; instead, in the case of sexual touchings or requests for favors, the
plaintiff should have to prove that the conduct was "' unilateral or disregarding of her
desires'"); cf. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 489-92 (making a similar argument using the con-
cepts of "personhood" and "humiliation"). The requirement under current law that the
plaintiff must prove that the challenged conduct was "based on sex" provides an example
of the latter sloganeering. Abrams prefers that she prove it was "'connected with the en-
forcement of a sex and gender hierarchy.'" Abrams, supra note 1, at 1223. Alas, everything
is in this way connected to everyone; we are all plaintiffs and defendants now.
93 D. MarvinJones, The Death of the Employer: Image, Text, and Title V, 45 VAN. L. REV.
349, 357 (1992).
94 Id. at 358-66.
95 Id. at 395.
96 Cf George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REv. 117, 127-29
(1995) (arguing that some sense of intent always flavors the verb "to discriminate").
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legislatures, workplaces, unions, and public opinion, while saving
courts for the functions they best serve. Thus it was quite right of
Abrams to speak out in a law review rather than as an attorney for a
client, and I am honored to join her here, where I continue to defend
an adjudicative approach to sexual harassment law.
In my view, adjudication is progressive. An oldjurisprudence
concept such as legal recognition of respect links the conflicts of the
moment, such as strife in the workplace, with traditions that have
been articulated in courtroom accounts of the past. Precedents be-
come instruments. Working with-but separate from-groups and
their causes, private law is a fulcrum that moves the world. Abrams
and I can agree on the question of where to move. The difference of
opinion between us is not a zero-sum contest in which either group
rights or respect for individuals must vanquish the other. We have
proposed two routes to the same destination.
